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Earnings Asymmetric Timeliness and Shareholder Distributions 
 
 
Abstract:  We study whether more asymmetrically timely earnings constrain payouts to 
shareholders in the presence of bad news.  Our goal is to provide evidence on the ex post 
contracting benefits of accounting conservatism.  We distinguish between cash flow 
asymmetric timeliness and accrual asymmetric timeliness to examine how each relates to 
asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder payouts.  We find that only the asymmetric 
timeliness of cash flows is significantly related to the asymmetric sensitivity of 
shareholder payouts.  Other measures of conservatism (earnings skewness and 
accumulated nonoperating accruals) are also not significantly related to the sensitivity of 
shareholder payouts given bad news.  These results suggest that accounting policies do 
not significantly constrain shareholder distributions conditional on news that does not 
affect cash flows. 
 
Keywords:  Asymmetric timeliness, shareholder distributions 
 
Data Availability:  The data used in this study are from the public sources identified in 
the text. 
 
I. Introduction  
 We study whether shareholder payouts are more sensitive to bad news when 
earnings are more sensitive to bad news.  Our goal is to provide evidence on the benefits 
of conservative accounting for bondholders.  We find that the sensitivity of payouts to 
bad news is related to the sensitivity of a firm’s cash flows to bad news.  However, we 
are unable to find a significant link between the sensitivity of accruals to bad news and 
payout sensitivity.  While asymmetric timeliness is our primary measure of the sensitivity 
of earnings to bad news, we also examine the relation between payout sensitivity and 
other measures of accounting conservatism including earnings skewness and accumulated 
nonoperating accruals.  Our results suggest that care should be exercised when drawing 
links between accrual decisions and contracting benefits based on measures of earnings 
conservatism. 
 Prior research claims that accounting conservatism can control the agency costs of 
debt (Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 2000, and Watts, 2003) and finds that greater 
conservatism is associated with a lower cost of debt (Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and 
Stanford-Harris, 2002, and Zhang, 2008) and greater leverage (Khan and Watts, 2007, 
and Frankel and Roychowdhury, 2007).  Zhang’s (2008) research ties the lower cost of 
debt to the potential benefits gained by the lender over the life of the loan.  She shows 
that firms with more conservative accounting are more likely to violate covenants given 
bad news.  Thus, accounting conservatism offers ex post contracting benefits to lenders 
by allowing them to renegotiate loan terms when the borrower’s financial position 
deteriorates.    
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 Research finds a positive association between current shareholder payouts and 
current earnings.1  However, an unanswered question is whether earnings timeliness, 
particularly timeliness with respect to negative news, is associated with cross-sectional 
variation in the relation between shareholder payouts and stock returns.  Differences in 
bondholder and stockholder preferences with regard to payout policy are a potentially 
significant source of agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and Myers, 1977).     
Because of limited shareholder liability, bondholders would like expected losses to 
constrain payouts while not allowing expansion of payouts given expected gains.  Using 
stock returns to measure gains and losses, we test whether cross-sectional variation in the 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings is associated with cross-sectional variation in the 
relation between payout policy and gains/losses.  In this way, we extend Zhang’s (2008) 
search for links between accounting conservatism and ex post benefits to lenders by 
examining the relation of accounting conservatism and payouts to shareholders.   
 Furthermore, we distinguish between the cash flow and the accrual components of 
earnings and relate the asymmetric timeliness of each component to the response of 
shareholder payouts to good and bad news.  Cash-flow constraints directly affect payouts 
because a firm that does not have access to cash cannot distribute cash to its shareholders.  
For example, expected gains or growth options that are not yet realized in cash cannot be 
distributed to shareholders.  In contrast, the relation between accruals and shareholder 
distributions is more complex.  Accrual-based constraints operate via debt covenants, 
state laws, or implicit commitments enforced by reputation.  Empirical evidence finds 
                                                 
1 See for example, Lintner, 1956, Healy and Palepu, 1988, Bernartzi, Michaely, and Thaler, 1997 for 
evidence on the relation between dividends and earnings.  Skinner, 2007, examines the correlation between 
payouts and earnings and finds a significantly positive relation between payouts and earnings for firms that 
make regular payouts between 1995 and 2005. 
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that special items are unrelated to payout policy (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 
1992, Skinner, 2004, and Skinner, 2007), raising questions about the accrual/payout 
relation.        
Our method for studying the relation between asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
and corporate payouts is as follows.  We investigate shareholder distributions by firms 
between 1997 and 2005.  Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is measured via firm-
specific-Basu (1997) regression estimated using annual earnings and stock returns for the 
current year and the previous nine years.  Distributions to shareholders are defined as 
dividends plus stock repurchases less stock issuances. 2   We first examine how 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings interacts with asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder 
distributions.  We measure the sensitivity of corporate distributions by regressing 
shareholder-distribution yields on stock returns.  Consistent with Ball et al. (2000) and 
bondholder preferences, we demonstrate that shareholder distributions are more sensitive 
to negative returns than to positive returns.  However, we find that asymmetric sensitivity 
of corporate distributions to bad news is positively, but not significantly related to 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings.  The relation remains insignificant when earnings 
asymmetric timeliness is computed using earnings before special items.  
Second, we estimate firm-specific measures of asymmetric timeliness of accruals 
and cash flows separately by regressing each of these earnings components on returns.  
Accruals are defined as earnings minus cash flows.  Two definitions of accruals are used 
by defining cash flows as operating cash flows and as operating plus investing cash 
flows.  We find that the asymmetric timeliness of cash flows is significantly and 
                                                 
2 We use a comprehensive measure of net distributions under the assumption that wealth transfers from 
bondholders result from a reduction of net shareholders’ equity.  That is, if a firm pays a $1 dividend and 
issues $1 of stock, the value of debt remains the same. 
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positively related to the asymmetric sensitivity of distributions, regardless of how cash 
flows are defined.  However, firms with more asymmetrically timely accruals do not have 
significantly more asymmetrically sensitive payouts.  These results are robust to the 
inclusion of size, book-to-market, and leverage. 
To better understand whether our inability to find a significant relation between 
accrual asymmetric timeliness and payout asymmetric sensitivity is the result of our 
methods, we employ alternative measures of accrual conservatism, re-estimate our 
measure of firm-specific asymmetric timeliness using a 15-year rather than a 10-year 
window, and attempt to isolate more powerful subsamples.  The alternative measures of 
conservatism include (1) the ratio of R2s from separate regression of accruals on returns 
when returns are negative and positive, (2) the skewness of earnings relative to the 
skewness of cash flows, and (3) accumulated nonoperating accruals.  We are unable to 
find a significant relation between these measures of accrual asymmetric 
timeliness/conservatism and payout asymmetric sensitivity.  Next, we re-estimate firm-
specific asymmetric timeliness using a 15-year estimation window rather than a 10-year 
window.  In this specification, the relation between accrual asymmetric timeliness and 
payout asymmetric sensitivity remains insignificant.  Finally, we re-estimate the relation 
between accrual asymmetric timeliness and payout asymmetric sensitivity in firms where 
conflicts between bondholders and shareholders are likely to be more pronounced (i.e., 
firms with high leverage, firms with low debt ratings, firms with more volatile ROA).  
The relation between accrual asymmetric timeliness and payout asymmetric sensitivity 
continues to be insignificant.  Given that the relation between operating cash flow 
asymmetric timeliness and payout asymmetric sensitivity continues to be significant in 
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many of these alternative tests, we conclude that lack of power and inappropriate 
estimation methods are unlikely to be the reason for a lack of a significant finding with 
regard to accrual asymmetric timeliness. 
Our results suggest that greater asymmetrically-timely recognition of non-cash 
losses relative to gains does not significantly contribute to the asymmetric sensitivity of 
shareholder distributions.  Cash flows play a more decisive role in shaping the 
asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder distributions than accruals.  Firms that are more 
asymmetrically timely in the realization of losses relative to gains are more 
asymmetrically timely in reducing shareholder distributions in the presence of losses 
relative to increasing shareholder distributions given gains.  
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section II, we develop our hypotheses. In 
Section III, we describe the data, discuss our research design, and report empirical 
results.  In Section IV, we conclude. 
 
II. Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder payouts and bondholder/stockholder 
conflicts 
 
The distribution of assets to shareholders can increase shareholder wealth despite 
a reduction in enterprise value when the efficiency loss is offset by the wealth transfer 
from the bondholders to the shareholders (Galai and Masulis, 1976, and Myers, 1977).  
To limit the expected efficiency loss, shareholders and bondholders can agree, ex ante, to 
restrict dividends (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and Myers, 1977).  However, agency 
costs arising from shareholders' relations with managers suggest that the corner solution 
of paying no dividend is also inefficient (Grossman and Hart, 1980, Easterbrook, 1984, 
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Jensen and Meckling, 1986).  If no shareholder distributions are made, the cash retained 
by successful firms would likely exceed their investment opportunities.  DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Stulz (2004) find that if the 25 largest long-standing dividend payers had 
paid no dividend between 1950 and 2002, they would accumulate $1.6 trillion in cash and 
their cash balances would exceed 51% of total assets rather than the current 6% of total 
assets.  Therefore, shareholders seek to pay dividends while simultaneously limiting the 
payout-related wealth transfers.  Payout restrictions are often implemented via debt 
covenants with accounting-based benchmarks (e.g., Smith and Warner, 1979, Kalay, 
1982, Leftwich, 1983, and Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  Ball, Kothari, and Robin 
(2000) and Watts (2003) argue that asymmetric timeliness of earnings can increase the 
efficiency of accounting-based debt covenants.  That is, covenant benchmarks using 
asymmetrically timely earnings as an input can more effectively thwart distributions to 
shareholders that transfer wealth from bondholders.3   
Up-side limits on the value of the bondholders' claim and their ex-post-settling-up 
problem with shareholders imply that bondholders prefer a dividend policy that 
constrains payouts in the face of expected losses but does not allow payouts to increase in 
light of anticipated gains.  A simple example illustrates this point.  Assume a two-period 
world.   The initial value of the firm’s assets exceeds the promised payment on its debt by 
$1.  The debt matures at the end of period two.  The initial value of assets is not subject to 
variation, and thus in the absence of new projects or interim payouts to shareholders, 
bondholders are assured of receiving their promised payment. 
                                                 
3 Conflicts between bondholders and shareholders also arise because of asset substitution.  Asymmetric 
timeliness of accounting earnings can also reduce these conflicts by making managers more risk averse.  If 
managers are compensated based on accounting earnings, immediate recognition of anticipated losses and 
delayed recognition of gains imply that the present value of compensation declines as the variance of 
economic earnings increases. 
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Assume that the firm undertakes a new project at the beginning of period one. 
Case 1.  Assume that the project pays off either $1 or $0 at the end of period two.  
At the end of period one, the firm learns the probability of the positive payoff, p, and thus 
the expected value of the project (and the firm).  However, this probability does not affect 
the liquidation value of the firm.  Shareholders can receive a dividend in period one.  
Assume that the dividend is restricted to be $1 plus period-one earnings.  If the expected 
payoff of the project is recognized as period-one earnings, a dividend of $1+$p can be 
paid to shareholders, but this dividend results in a transfer of wealth from the 
bondholders.  If period-one earnings recognize $p, bondholders' expected loss is -(1-
p)*$p.  If the eventual payoff from the project is zero, bondholders receive the promised 
payment on the debt minus $p.  If the project yields $1, bondholders only receive the 
promised payment on the debt.  Bondholders would prefer that no dividend beyond $1 be 
paid until the gain is realized.  Thus, if the allowable dividend was $1 plus earnings in 
period one, bondholders would prefer that $p not be recognized as earnings.     
Case 2.  Alternatively, assume that the project offers a chance of a negative 
payoff instead of a positive payoff, videlicet, the potential payoff at the end of period two 
is -$1 with probability p and zero with probability 1-p.  In this case, the bondholders 
prefer that period-one earnings recognize the expected loss rather than ignore it.  If the 
loss is not recognized, shareholders can receive a dividend of $1 in period one and 
bondholders' expected loss is -$p.  Recognition of the expected project loss in earnings 
reduces dividend payment in period one by $p and bondholders' expected loss to $p2-$p.  
Thus, if earnings is used to determine the maximum interim dividend, bondholders prefer 
asymmetric recognition of gains and losses.  That is, they wish expected losses to be 
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recognized in earnings and prefer that recognition of expected gains be delayed until they 
are realized.   
In this example, payment of dividend does not affect investments and therefore 
does not lead to an efficiency loss.  Thus, the shareholders have no clear preference for 
asymmetrically timely loss recognition.  Bondholders will price the expected wealth 
transfers in the initial loan terms and shareholders will pay for expected wealth transfers.  
However, if transferring wealth via interim distributions leads shareholders to forego 
positive net present value investments, and if bondholders are price protected, 
shareholders have an incentive to “tie their hands” so that the firm is not expected to 
deviate from market-value maximization and to do so at the lowest possible cost (Fama, 
1978).   Thus, shareholders will prefer asymmetric recognition of gains and losses 
because asymmetrically timely loss recognition enhances the ability of the debt contract 
to reduce the deadweight loss associated with wealth transfers. 
The above example suggests that bondholders prefer that no dividend be paid.  
However, this restriction is costly if the rate of return earned on cash retained by the firm 
is lower than the rate that could be earned in the pockets of shareholders.  Therefore, 
shareholders will seek an alternative that permits dividends to be paid in situations where 
a wealth transfer is unlikely.  The example illustrates that debt covenants combined with 
asymmetrically timely earnings recognition can provide this alternative by reducing the 
expected loss to bondholders that can accompany shareholder distributions.  Bondholders 
prefer asymmetrically timely earnings because it does not recognize anticipated gains and 
thus reduces the ex-post-settling-up problem that results when dividends are paid on 
anticipated gains.  Because of asymmetric timeliness of earnings, shareholders' equity 
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and thus slack of debt covenants decrease in light of bad news (expected losses) but do 
not increase given good news (expected gains).    
2.2 Asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder payouts and asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings 
     
Current shareholder distributions are a function of multiple variables besides 
current earnings.  For example, Lintner (1956) shows that dividends tend to be path 
dependent.  Skinner (2007) provides evidence that since 1980, firms who continue to pay 
dividends do so because they have done so in the past.  When making stock repurchase 
decisions, managers consider EPS effects and market timing as well as residual cash 
flows (Brav et al., 2005).   Moreover, current-period accruals, per se, do not constrain 
current-period payouts.  Therefore, in the absence of debt covenants, legal constraints, 
reputation costs, etc., symmetric timeliness of earnings does not necessarily imply 
asymmetrically sensitive distributions.   
  To analyze the relation between earnings and shareholder payouts, we begin by 
writing earnings as a function of operating cash flows and accruals.  Next, we relate each 
of these components to shareholder distributions.  Following Sloan (1996), we define 
earnings as follows: 
Earnings(t-1, t) = OCF(t-1, t) + Accruals (t-1, t), (1) 
where Earnings(t-1, t) is net income between time t-1 and t, OCF is operating cash flows, 
and Accruals are increases in non-cash current assets minus increases in current liabilities 
(excluding the current portion of long-term debt) minus depreciation expense.4   The 
change in cash is represented by the following formula:  
Cash(t-1) + OCF(t-1, t) + ICF(t-1, t) + FCF(t-1, t) = Cash(t), (2) 
                                                 
4 Capitalization of cash expenditures giving rise to long-term assets is also an accrual.  Our tests include a 
broader definition of accruals that includes the effects of these investments. 
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Where ICF is investing cash flows, and FCF is financing cash flows.  Kalay (1982) uses a 
similar formula.  We decompose FCF(t-1, t) as follows: 
FCF(t-1, t) = DEBT_Issue (t-1, t) + EQ_Issue (t-1, t), (3) 
where DEBT_Issue is net debt issuance, EQ_Issue is net equity issuance (i.e., issuance 
minus repurchases minus dividends paid).  Substituting equation (3) into equation (2) and 
rearranging terms yields the following relation between shareholder distributions and 
cash flows: 
EQ_Issue(t-1, t) = Cash(t) – Cash(t-1) – OCF(t-1, t) – ICF(t-1, t)  
 – DEBT_Issue(t-1, t) (4)  
Equation (4) expresses the tautological relation between EQ_Issue and OCF.  Because 
EQ_Issue > 0 implies that the firm is a net issuer of stock, more operating cash flows 
imply greater net distributions to shareholders.5  Thus, asymmetrically timely operating 
cash flows imply asymmetrically sensitive net payouts.6    
 However, the relation between EQ_Issue and earnings is not unambiguously 
specified via the cash flow formula.  Rewriting equation (1) in terms of OCF and 
substituting for OCF in equation (4) link Earnings to EQ_Issue.   
EQ_Issue(t-1, t) = Cash(t) – Cash(t-1) – Earnings(t-1, t) + Accruals(t-1, t) 
  – ICF(t-1, t) – DEBT_Issue(t-1, t) (5)  
That is, increases in Earnings are not tautologically linked to increases in EQ_Issue.  To 
the extent that the source of Earnings is operating cash flows, equation (4) links Earnings 
                                                 
5 According to equation (3), this statement is true ceteris paribus.  We do not imply that this statement is 
true empirically.  Firms faced with lower operating cash flows can cut capital expenditures to sustain 
shareholder payouts.  Survey evidence by Brav et al. (2005) suggests that financial executives place 
dividend decisions and investment decisions on equal footing. 
6 This paper is not intended to examine why cash flows are asymmetrically timely.  A possible reason for 
asymmetric timeliness of cash flows is managers' desire to minimize present value of taxes.  For example, 
managers are more likely to abandon losing projects that will lead to recognition of losses than those 
associated with gains.   
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to shareholder distributions.  However, if the source of Earnings is an increase in 
Accruals, equation (5) provides no formulaic link between earnings and shareholder 
distributions.  
 The relation between the income statement and the balance sheet provides a 
formula that can, via legal restriction, create a direct relation between current accruals 
and current shareholder distributions.   
ShareEq(t) = Earnings(t-1, t) + EQ_Issue(t-1, t) + OCI (t-1, t) + ShareEq(t-1), (6) 
where ShareEq is the level of shareholders' equity and OCI is other comprehensive 
income.  Solving (6) for EQ_Issue yields 
EQ_Issue(t-1, t) = – Earnings(t-1, t) – OCI (t-1, t) + (ShareEq(t) – ShareEq(t-1)). (6a) 
According to equation (6a), holding fixed OCI(t-1,t) and the change in ShareEq, 
increased Earnings imply increased net distributions to shareholders whether the source 
of earnings is accruals or operating cash flows.  By requiring ShareEq(t) to exceed a 
predetermined threshold, a debt covenant enforces the mathematical relation between 
Earnings and EQ_Issue given in (6a).  For lenders seeking to curtail shareholder 
distributions that increase the riskiness of debt, restrictions based on shareholders’ equity 
have an advantage over cash-based restrictions.  Unlike cash-based restrictions, the 
borrower cannot relax shareholders’-equity-based constraints by increasing investing 
cash flows (e.g., selling property, plant and equipment) or additional borrowing.  The 
disadvantage of shareholders’-equity-based covenants is that managers can forestall 
technical default by accrual-increasing accounting choices (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994, 
Sweeney, 1994, Dichev and Skinner, 2002).   
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 The incremental effect of accounting earnings beyond cash flows in restricting 
shareholders payouts is unclear because negative covenants preventing liquidation of 
property and additional senior borrowing are common. 7   These covenants prevent 
payouts that cannot be financed by operations by restricting actions rather than setting 
minimum accounting outcomes.  Thus, these covenants can substitute for and reduce the 
economic importance of shareholders'-equity-based covenants and simultaneously reduce 
the contracting importance of accruals. 
                                                
 The analysis in this section suggests the importance of determining whether the 
relation between payout policy and earnings arises from operating cash flows or accruals.  
The relation between operating cash flows and payout policy stems from the cash-flow 
formula.  This formulaic relation could lead to an empirical relation between earnings 
characteristics and payout policy characteristics.  In fact, Skinner (2007) finds that net 
repurchases are significantly related to earnings between 1995 and 2005.  We extend his 
findings by examining whether the asymmetric timeliness of earnings is related to the 
asymmetric sensitivity of payouts.   
 In addition, to understand whether payout characteristics are related to accounting 
policy decisions, we examine the relation between payout policy characteristics and the 
characteristics of accruals.  In particular, if balance sheet constraints shape payouts, we 
expect accrual characteristics to be associated with payout characteristics.  This 
discussion suggests three hypotheses: 
 
7  For example, a 29 March 2002 lending agreement between Silicon Valley Bank and Insightful 
Corporation prevents Insightful from selling equipment, without lender approval, unless it is “worn-out or 
obsolete.”  Similarly, a 15 November 2004 lending agreement between Arlie Opportunity Master Fund, 
Ltd. And Mobilepro Corp. prevents the sale of any assets unless assets are sold at market value and 
proceeds are used to repay the loan.  
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   H1: Asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder distributions is positively 
associated with asymmetric timeliness of earnings. 
 
   H2: Asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder distributions is positively 
associated with asymmetric timeliness of cash flows. 
    
   H3: Asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder distributions is positively 
associated with asymmetric timeliness of accruals. 
 
III. Data and Empirical tests 
3.1 Sample selection and data description 
  
 Our sample consists of firm-year observations with necessary data during 1997-
2005.  Our sample period begins in 1997 because operating cash flows (COMPUSTAT 
#308) are available for most firms starting in 1988 and we require cash-flow-statement 
data for ten years to compute the asymmetric timeliness of cash flows and accruals for 
each firm-year observation.  We exclude financial firms (SIC between 6000 and 6999) 
and utility firms (SIC between 4999 and 5000) because regulatory oversight can affect 
payout policy.  We also exclude American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and firms 
designated as pre-FASB.  Finally, we eliminate firm-years with negative assets or sales.  
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile of their respective 
distributions. 
 We measure asymmetric timeliness of earnings using Basu (1997) regression.   
Ei,t/MVEi,t-1 = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2RETi,t  + α3NEGRETi,t* RETi,t,  (7) 
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where Ei,t is the earnings before extraordinary items of firm i in year t,8 RETi,t is the stock 
returns for firm i in year t, NEGRETi,t is an indicator variable equal to one if returns for 
firm i in year t are negative, and MVEi,t-1 is the market value of common equity for firm i 
at the beginning of year t.  In regression (7), stock returns are used as a proxy for 
economic gains and losses.  If accounting earnings recognize economic losses more 
quickly than gains, the association between accounting earnings and stock returns is 
expected to be higher when stock returns are negative.  Thus, the coefficient α3 on 
NEGRET*RET measures the incremental timeliness of loss recognition in earnings and 
serves as our first and primary measure of asymmetric timeliness of earnings (AT).  Our 
second measure is based on the relative explanatory power of stock returns for earnings 
in years with bad news compared to that in years with good news.  It is defined as the 
ratio of r-square of regression (7) (excluding terms containing NEGRET) estimated using 
negative return years to the r-square of the regression estimated using positive return 
years (R2bad/R2good).  We also use regression (7) to estimate asymmetric timeliness of 
operating cash flows (Compustat #308) and the asymmetric timeliness of accrual 
component (earnings - Compustat #308).9   
 To obtain a firm-year-specific measure of asymmetric timeliness of earnings, cash 
flows and accruals, we estimate regression (7) for each firm in each year over the ten-
year period from year t-9 to year t.  To implement the estimation, we require that the firm 
                                                 
8 Research shows that special items are not related to payout policy (DeAngelo et al., 1992, Skinner, 2004, 
and Skinner, 2007).  Therefore, in untabulated analyses, we remove special items from earnings and get 
qualitatively similar results.   
9 We also employ an alternative definition of cash flows and accruals in our tests: cash flows are defined as 
the sum of operating cash flows and investing cash flows (Compustat #308 + Compustat #311), and 
accruals are defined as the difference between earnings and cash flows.  We examine the effect of this 
definition on our results because the distinction between operating cash flows and investing cash flows is 
subject to management discretion and can vary with a firm’s accounting policy.  For example, a firm may 
decide that R&D related to software meets the criteria for capitalization and classify payments as investing 
cash flows.   
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have non-missing data for earnings or its cash flow or accrual component, stock price and 
returns during the ten years.  To increase the power of our α3 estimate, we require that the 
firm have at least two years and at most eight years with negative returns during the ten-
year period.  Similarly, to meaningfully estimate R2bad/R2good, we require that the firm 
have at least three years and at most seven years with negative returns during the ten-year 
period.   
 Besides asymmetric timeliness, we use two additional measures of conservatism 
employed in the literature (e.g., Givoly and Hayn, 2000, and Zhang, 2008).  The first is 
the relative skewness of earnings (CONSV_skew), defined as the skewness of earnings 
divided by the skewness of operating cash flows for each firm over a ten-year period 
from year t-9 to year t, multiplied by -1.  Earnings are likely to be negatively skewed if 
bad news is incorporated into earnings in a more timely manner.  Losses will tend to be 
larger than gains because gains will be spread across multiple periods.  We multiply the 
ratio of earnings' skewness to cash flows' skewness by -1 so that a larger value indicates 
greater conservatism.  The second measure is accumulated nonoperating accruals divided 
by accumulated total assets (CONSV_accrual).  Accumulated nonoperating accruals 
reflect bad news recorded over time.  We also multiply this measure by -1 so that a higher 
CONSV_accrual value indicates that accrual recognition is more conservative.   
 We derive our measure of shareholder distributions (NetPayout) from information 
in the financing section of the Statement of Cash Flows.  Our intent is to measure net 
distributions to existing shareholders that directly transfer wealth from existing 
bondholders to existing shareholders.  Allen and Michaely (2003) document that cash 
paid to target shareholders in cash acquisitions can exceed cash paid to the firm’s existing 
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shareholders in the form of repurchases and dividends.  From the point of view of the 
firm’s bondholders, cash-based acquisitions are similar to investments.  The firm 
exchanges a less risky asset (cash) for a more risky asset (e.g., receivables, inventory, 
PP&E, goodwill).  Any debt assumed by the acquirer is economically similar to debt used 
to finance investment.    While cash-based acquisitions affect the value of the firm’s debt 
and can result in wealth transfers from bondholders to stockholders, they are an exchange 
with target shareholders rather than a distribution to existing shareholders.  These 
transactions are economically distinct from asset distributions to the firm’s existing 
shareholders.  Our payout measure excludes the effects of cash-based acquisitions. 
 Stock-based acquisitions are also an exchange between the firm and target 
shareholders.  However, the effect of a stock-based acquisition can be economically 
similar to the issuance of stock.  For example, if an unlevered target whose only asset is 
cash is acquired for stock, the transaction is equivalent to the issuance of stock, provided 
the value of stock offered is equal to the value of the target’s cash (i.e., no goodwill 
arises).  Alternatively, if the assets acquired cause the variance of combined assets to 
exceed the variance of the acquirer’s pre-acquisition assets, the acquisition can reduce the 
value of debt and is not economically similar to the issuance of stock for cash.  Our 
measure of net payout is not affected by stock-based acquisitions unless the acquirer first 
repurchases stock for cash and then exchanges the repurchased stock for the stock of 
target shareholders.  We capture the repurchase side of the transaction.  Our measure 
excludes the equity-based investment (i.e., the exchange of acquirer equity for target 
equity).  To test the sensitivity of our results to the effects of non-cash acquisitions, we 
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rerun our tests excluding observations with equity-based acquisitions in the current and 
the subsequent year.  The results are discussed in robustness tests (section 3.4).   
 Acquisitions highlight the link between investment and payouts to shareholders.  
This relation is made explicit when equity is used to finance an investment as can occur 
in the case of an acquisition.  However, the use of equity to finance the acquisition of a 
firm is similar to the use of equity to finance a project.  Equation (4) indicates that 
operating cash flows, investing cash flows, and financing cash flows are related.  The 
relation between operating cash flows and financing cash flows can be viewed as the 
residual of the relation between financing cash flows and investing cash flows.  For 
example, if current bad news leads to increases in investment, we will find reductions in 
shareholder payouts associated with bad news.  Such reductions are necessitated by the 
firm’s investment strategy, not its earnings properties.  To control for the effects of 
investment, we include investing cash flows (level and change) as an independent 
variable in our estimations in robustness analyses. 
 Another issue arising with respect to measurement of shareholder distributions is 
stock purchased to cover the exercise of stock options or for employee stock ownership 
plans (ESOP) (Fama and French, 2001).  The cash used to purchase shares is an outflow 
of assets to existing shareholders and is not different from a straight repurchase.  Our 
cash-based measure (NetPayout) treats these repurchases as a distribution.  However, our 
measure ignores the subsequent reissuance of shares to the extent that no cash is received.  
This treatment of share reissuance is appropriate for our purpose because shares 
distributed to employees through an ESOP or via stock option exercises do not reduce 
shareholders’ equity.  They dilute the holdings of existing shareholders.  That is, they do 
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not reduce the size of the pie; they create more slices so that each piece of the pie is 
worth less.  As such, granting shares to an employee does not have the direct effect on 
bondholders that accompanies the payment of a dividend or the issuance of shares for 
cash.10   
 Variable definitions for the experimental and control variables are provided in 
Table 1.  Table 2 reports descriptive statistics.  Panel A of Table 2 shows that the mean of 
NetPayout is negative.  On average firms are net issuers of stock, raising capital from 
shareholders at a magnitude of 1.69% of beginning market value of equity.  Under the 
primary definition of asymmetric timeliness (i.e., the coefficient on NEGRET*RET in 
regression (7)), asymmetric timeliness of earnings (AT_EARN) has a mean (or median) 
of 0.0770 (or 0.0340), suggesting that earnings of sample firms more rapidly incorporate 
bad news compared to good news.  The means and medians of asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings components - cash flows and accruals - are also significantly positive.  
Asymmetric-timeliness property of both components contributes to the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings.  Similar results are obtained for the second definition of 
asymmetric timeliness (R2bad/R2good), i.e., earnings, cash flows and accruals incorporate 
bad news in a more timely manner.  For the other two measures of conservatism, average 
CONSV_accrual is positive, while average CONSV_skew is negative.   
Panel B of Table 2 presents the pair-wise Pearson correlations among key 
variables used in our tests.  Net payout (NetPayout) to common shareholders is 
negatively correlated with asymmetric timeliness of earnings (AT_EARN), asymmetric 
                                                 
10  Employee stock ownership can have indirect effects on bondholders by altering the incentives of 
managers (e.g., Begley and Felthman, 1999, and Lambert, Lanen, and Larker, 1989).  Beatty (1995) 
discusses the tax, capital structure, employee benefit, and corporate control effects of ESOPs.  In addition, 
when a firm pays its employees with cash, the payment reduces the value of debt and equity.  When a firm 
pays its employees with stock, equity holders bear the cost via dilution. 
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timeliness of accruals (AT_ACC) and accumulated nonoperating accruals 
(CONSV_accrual).  Net payout is negatively correlated with market-to-book ratio (MB), 
indicating that firms with more growth opportunities invest more and pay out less to 
shareholders.   Net payout is positively correlated with leverage and firm size (LogMVE).  
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings (AT_EARN) is positively correlated with asymmetric 
timeliness of accruals (AT_ACC) and asymmetric timeliness of cash flows (AT_OCF).  
 Asymmetric timeliness of accruals (AT_ACC) and asymmetric timeliness of cash 
flows (AT_OCF) are highly negatively correlated.  One possible explanation is that firms 
implement accrual policies to achieve an optimal AT_EARN (AT_EARN*) and 
AT_OCF is pre-determined by the firm’s prior production and investment decisions.  In 
this case, firms would choose AT_ACC such that the combination of AT_OCF and 
AT_ACC leads to AT_EARN*, which suggests an inverse relation between AT_OCF 
and AT_ACC.     
 
3.2 Association between asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder distributions and 
 asymmetric timeliness of earnings, cash flows and accruals 
 
 To investigate whether asymmetric timeliness of earnings (AT_EARN) reduces 
corporate distributions to shareholders in the presence of bad news, we examine the 
association between asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder distributions and AT_EARN.  
We begin by estimating the asymmetric sensitivity of net shareholder distributions using 
regression (8).   
NetPayouti,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2RETi,t  + α3NEGRETi,t*RETi,t,  (8) 
Regression (8) is similar to the Basu (1997) model, except that the dependent variable is 
shareholder-distribution yield rather than earnings-price ratio.  If corporate distributions 
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are more sensitive to negative news, they should have a greater association with negative 
stock returns, where NEGRETi,t and RETi,t are defined as in regression (7).  NetPayouti,t 
is net payout to common shareholders of firm i in year t, deflated by firm i's market value 
of common equity at the beginning of year t.  NetPayout is defined as cash dividends, 
plus stock repurchases (Compustat #115) minus equity issuances (Compustat #108).  We 
use cash dividend, instead of total dividends, to common shareholders under the 
assumption that stock dividends do not affect a firm's ability to repay debtholders.  To 
compute cash dividends to common shareholders, we subtract preferred dividends 
(Compustat #19) from total dividends on the Statement of Cash Flows (Compustat #127).  
To remove repurchases and new issuances related to preferred stock, we follow Grullon 
and Michaely (2002) to add back reductions in the redemption value of preferred stock 
(Compustat #56).11   
 Our method is similar to Ball et al. (2000) who examine the asymmetric 
timeliness of dividends.  We use a broader measure to capture net distributions to 
shareholders.  A dollar distributed to shareholders affects debtholders in the same manner 
whether the distribution occurs via a share repurchase or a one-time dividend.  Similarly, 
if a firm pays dividends and offsets these dividends with proceeds from a stock offering, 
the firm’s ability to pay back bondholders is not affected.12 
 We report estimation results from equation (8) in Table 3.  We find that the 
coefficient α3 on NEGRET*RET is significantly positive, suggesting that net payout is 
                                                 
11 We focus on payouts to common shareholders under the assumption that the voting rights of common 
shareholders allow them to pressure managers to make decisions that transfer wealth from the bondholders.  
However, we find similar results to those tabulated if dividends, repurchases, and issuances related to 
preferred stock are included in the payout measures.   
12 Untabulated results suggest that NetPayout has insignificant serial correlation for 83% of our sample 
firms, while changes in NetPayout exhibit negative serial correlation in 55% of our firms.  These results 
suggest that differencing to remove serial correlation is not appropriate. 
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more sensitive to negative news than to good news.  This result is consistent with the 
dividend result for U.S. firms in Ball et al. (2000).13  The negative coefficient on RET 
suggests market timing of a firm's shareholder distributions.  For example, when the 
performance of a firm's stock is good (i.e., RET>0), the firm tends to make less payout to 
shareholders by issuing more stock and repurchasing less.14   
 Next, to examine how asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder distributions interacts 
with asymmetric timeliness of earnings (AT_EARN), we add AT_EARN and its 
interaction with stock returns to regression (8).  The expanded regression is as follows.   
NetPayouti,t = α0 + α1NEGRETi,t + α2RETi,t  + α3NEGRETi,t*RETi,t  
                       + β0AT_EARNi,t+ β1NEGRETi,t*AT_EARNi,t  
                      + β2RETi,t*AT_EARNi,t + β3NEGRETi,t*RETi,t*AT_EARNi,t. (9) 
If shareholder distributions are more sensitive to bad news when asymmetric timeliness 
of earnings (AT_EARN) is greater, we expect a positive coefficient on 
NEGRET*RET*AT_EARN (Hypothesis 1).   
 Estimation results for regression (9) using our primary measure of asymmetric 
timeliness (i.e., coefficient on NEGRET*RET in regression (7)) are presented in column 
(1) of Table 4 Panel A. 15   We find a positive but insignificant coefficient on 
NEGRET*RET*AT_EARN.  Thus the asymmetric sensitivity of net payout to 
shareholders is not significantly related to the asymmetric timeliness of earnings.  In 
                                                 
13 We find similar results when using the level of dividends to common stockholders as the dependent 
variable. 
14 When we use dividend, instead of net payout, as the dependent variable, the coefficient on RET is also 
negative, consistent with the finding on dividend for U.S. firms in Ball et al. (2000).   
15 To reduce the impact of outliers and estimation noise of asymmetric timeliness (AT) or conservatism 
(CONSV) measures, we use the percentile rank of each AT or CONSV measure in regression estimations.  
Our results are robust to using raw measures winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile of their respective 
distributions.   
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columns (3) and (5), we examine the relation between asymmetric sensitivity of net 
payout and asymmetric timeliness of earnings components—cash flows (AT_OCF or 
AT_CF) and accruals (AT_ACC or AT_ACCOI) (Hypotheses 2 and 3).  We find  
significantly positive coefficients on NEGRET*RET*AT_OCF (column (3)) and 
NEGRET*RET*AT_CF (column (5)), indicating that asymmetric sensitivity of net 
payout to shareholders becomes more pronounced as asymmetric timeliness of cash flows 
grows (Hypothesis 2), under both measures of cash flows.  However, asymmetric 
timeliness of accruals is not significantly related to the asymmetric sensitivity of 
shareholder distributions.  The coefficient on NEGRET*RET*AT_ACC (column (3)) or 
NEGRET*RET*AT_ACCOI (column (5)) is not significant.  These results suggest that 
the cash flow relation in equation (4) imposes a binding constraint on payouts to 
shareholders, while the shareholders’ equity relation in equation (6a) does not.  Thus, we 
are unable to provide evidence consistent with the notion that changes in accounting 
policies with regard to accruals are instrumental in limiting wealth transfers between 
bondholders and shareholders. 
 Research shows that asymmetric timeliness of earnings (AT_EARN) is highly 
correlated with leverage, market-to-book ratio, and firm size (e.g., Khan and Watts, 2007, 
and Frankel and Roychowdhury, 2007).  To test whether the effect of AT of earnings or 
its components on asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder distributions is incremental to 
the effects of leverage, market-to-book, and firm size, we add these variables and their 
interactions with stock returns to regression (9).  Columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 4 
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Panel A present the estimation results of these expanded regressions.  After controlling 
for the effects of leverage, book-to-market, and firm size, we get similar results.16   
 Due to the difficulty in estimating asymmetric timeliness of earnings or its 
components at firm level, estimation noise can be a potential reason for the insignificant 
relation between asymmetric sensitivity of payouts and asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
or accruals.  To better understand the relation between accrual asymmetric timeliness and 
payout asymmetric sensitivity, we report the estimation results of regression (9) using 
alternative asymmetric timeliness or conservatism measures in Panels B, C and D of 
Table 4.  In Panel B, we report the estimation results using the second measure of 
asymmetric timeliness - relative explanatory power of stock returns for earnings in years 
with bad news compared to that in years with good news (R2bad/R2good).  In column (2), 
the coefficient on NEGRET*RET*AT_EARN is marginally significant.  After dividing 
earnings into accruals and cash flows, the coefficients on NEGRET*RET*AT_ACC in 
column (4) and on NEGRET*RET*AT_ACCOI in column (6) are not significant.  
Therefore, we do not find evidence suggesting that firms with more asymmetrically 
timely accruals have more asymmetrically sensitive payouts.  In column (6), the 
coefficient on NEGRET*RET*AT_CF is significant, consistent with the result on cash 
flows in Panel A.  We report the estimation results using the other two measures of 
conservatism, relative skewness of earnings (CONSV_skew) and accumulated 
nonoperating accruals (CONSV_accrual), in Panel C.  We do not find that the 
asymmetric sensitivity of net payout changes with either measure.  To reduce estimation 
noise in asymmetric timeliness measures, we increase the estimation period from 10 
                                                 
16 In untabulated robustness analysis, to control for the effect of investment on shareholder payout, we also 
add a firm's investing cash flows and its change in investing cash flows and the interactions of these two 
variables with stock returns to regression (9).  Results are qualitatively similar.   
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years to 15 years (year t-14 to year t) and re-estimate regression (9) using 15-year 
measures.  In Panel D, we report the estimation results using our primary definition of 
asymmetric timeliness (i.e., the coefficient on NEGRET*RET in regression (7)) 
estimated over 15 years.  The coefficient on NEGRET*RET*AT_EARN or 
NEGRET*RET*AT_ACC is still not significant.  The coefficient on 
NEGRET*RET*AT_OCF continues to be significant.   
 The results in Panels B, C and D of Table 4 show that payout asymmetric 
sensitivity does not change with accrual asymmetric timeliness or conservatism, no 
matter how accrual asymmetric timeliness or conservatism is measured.  Such results 
suggest that noise or low power in the estimation of asymmetric timeliness measures do 
not appear to explain the insignificant result for accrual asymmetric timeliness, especially 
given the significant result for cash flow asymmetric timeliness in these analyses.   
 
3.3 Association between asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder distributions and 
 asymmetric timeliness of accruals in subsamples with pronounced 
 shareholder-debtholder conflicts 
 
 Overall, in Table 4, we do not find evidence suggesting that accrual policies affect 
asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder payouts.  One possible explanation for this result is 
that accrual policies do not matter in the overall sample because shareholder-debtholder 
conflicts with regard to payouts are irrelevant for firms with low conflicts.  Therefore, we 
focus on firms with more pronounced shareholder-debtholder conflicts and re-examine 
the relation between payout asymmetric sensitivity and accrual asymmetric timeliness. 
We identify subsamples with magnified shareholder-debtholder conflicts in three 
ways.  First, we study firms with leverage higher than the median.  Higher leverage 
implies that there is greater claim on the firm's assets by debtholders and that firm value 
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is likely to be closer to the value of the debt.  Shareholder-debtholder conflicts intensify 
as the value of assets approaches the value of liabilities.  Second, we examine firms with 
long-term public debt rating below investment grade (i.e., below BBB-).  DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (1990) find that dividend reductions for firms in financial distress are often 
associated with binding debt covenants.  To focus our attention on situations where 
covenants are apt to be more binding and where wealth-redistributing payouts are more 
likely, we examine whether asymmetric sensitivity of payouts is associated with 
asymmetric timeliness of accruals for firms in financial distress identified using long-
term public debt rating.  And third, we focus on firms with standard deviation of return 
on assets (STDROA) in the past six years higher than the median.  Performance 
uncertainty is greater for firms with more volatile ROA and therefore debtholders of 
these firms want to put a greater constraint on shareholder distributions given anticipated 
gains in case such gains will not be realized in the future.   
In Table 5, we report the estimation results for these three subsamples.  We do not 
find an association between asymmetric sensitivity of payouts and asymmetric timeliness 
of accruals.  The coefficient on NEGRET*RET*AT_ACC is insignificant in all three 
subsamples.  In the subsamples of firms with high leverage or high standard deviation of 
ROA, the coefficient on NEGRET*RET*AT_OCF is significantly positive.  Therefore, 
the results in Table 5 are consistent with the primary results in Table 4 Panel A:  Payout 
asymmetric sensitivity increases with cash flow asymmetric timeliness, but does not 
change with accrual asymmetric timeliness.   
 
3.4 Robustness tests 
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 Corporate law seeks to protect creditors by requiring firms to maintain some 
excess of asset values over liability values and thus allows dividend payments only if the 
firm meets certain capital requirements (Cox and Hazen, 2003).  Statutory dividend 
restrictions vary by state and can include one or more of the following characteristics: (1) 
prohibition of dividend payments by insolvent firms, (2) the requirement of some general 
surplus of assets in excess of liabilities,17 (3) the requirement of some earned surplus 
similar to retained earnings, (4) the requirement of current earnings instead of a capital 
surplus (5) the requirement of a minimum ratio of certain assets to current liabilities.  
Approximately one-half of the states base their statutes on the Model Business 
Corporation Act which prohibits dividends that would reduce the value of assets below 
that of liabilities plus amounts required for liquidation preferences.18   To understand 
whether statute-based-dividend restrictions play a role in the relation between AT and 
payout policy, we conduct additional tests that exclude observations with a negative 
stockholders' equity and separate tests that exclude observations with a stockholders' 
equity smaller than 10% of total assets.  In both analyses, we get results similar to those 
reported in the paper: Payout sensitivity is not significantly associated with asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings or accruals, but is significantly and positively associated with 
asymmetric timeliness of cash flows.  These results suggest that binding-state-statutory 
requirements are not the sole driver of our findings.  
 Equity-based acquisitions can be associated with an increase in the acquirer's 
asset variance and thus a decrease in its value of debt.  As discussed in section 3.1, it is 
possible that the acquirer can first repurchase stock for cash and then exchange the 
                                                 
17 Interestingly, unrealized gains on fixed assets are generally excluded from the computation of this 
surplus. 
18 A detailed enumeration of these restrictions can be found in Peterson and Hawkins (1997/1998). 
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repurchased stock for the stock of target shareholders.  Our measure of net payout 
captures the repurchase side of the transaction, but excludes the equity-based investment 
(i.e., the exchange of acquirer equity for target equity).  In this sensitivity test, we rerun 
our tests by excluding observations with equity-based acquisitions in the current and the 
subsequent year.  We choose to exclude these observations instead of reducing the net 
payout measure by the market value of the acquisition because this alternative method 
treats net assets acquired on an equivalent basis to cash, which is not reasonable if most 
of the net assets acquired are goodwill or are more risky than cash.  This alternative 
method would understate net payout from the point of view of bondholders.  We choose 
to exclude observations with equity-based acquisitions in the subsequent year as well to 
control for the possibility that a firm may repurchase stock in the current year and use the 
stock to acquire a company in the subsequent year.  After removing such observations, 
the positive coefficient on NEGRET*RET*AT_EARN in Table 4 Panel A becomes 
significant, but the coefficient on NEGRET*RET*AT_ACC or 
NEGRET*RET*AT_ACCOI remains insignificant and the coefficient on 
NEGRET*RET*AT_OCF or NEGRET*RET*AT_CF is still significantly positive.   
 To address the possibility that the association between asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings or its components and shareholder distributions vary across industries, we re-
estimate the regressions using industry-adjusted asymmetric timeliness (AT) or 
conservatism (COSNV) measures.  For each AT or CONSV measure, an industry average 
is computed for firms with the same industry classification according to Fama and French 
(1997) in each year and subtracted from the AT or CONSV measure of each firm.  Our 
primary conclusions do not change:  The asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder 
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distributions is significantly and positively associated with asymmetric timeliness of cash 
flows, but is not associated with the asymmetric timeliness of earnings or accruals. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 Theory suggests that asymmetric timeliness of earnings reduces agency costs by 
restricting distributions of the firm's net assets to shareholders when such distributions 
transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders.  We examine the validity of this 
conjecture by studying the association between asymmetric timeliness of earnings and 
shareholder distributions.   
 Because limited shareholder liability hinders retrieval of payments made to 
shareholders and because bondholder payouts are capped, bondholders prefer asymmetric 
sensitivity of shareholder payouts to anticipated gains and losses.  That is, they want 
distributions to shareholders to be reduced in light of anticipated losses, but to be 
increased only upon realization of gains.  We find that asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
is positively related to asymmetric sensitivity of net payout to shareholders but that this 
relation is not significant—casting doubt on the importance of earnings asymmetric 
timeliness in limiting wealth transfers from bondholders to stockholders via distributions 
from unrealized gains. 
 We decompose the earnings asymmetric timeliness into cash flow and accrual 
asymmetric timeliness to understand how each is related to asymmetric sensitivity of 
shareholder distributions.  Holding investment constant, operating cash flows directly 
confine payments to shareholders, while accruals can constrain payouts via contracts and 
other devices that limit distributions based on shareholders’ equity.  We find that 
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asymmetric timeliness of operating cash flows is significantly and positively related to 
asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder payouts, while asymmetric timeliness of accruals is 
not.  These results suggest that accounting policies with regard to accruals (e.g., 
depreciation method choices) do not have a significant influence on the asymmetric 
sensitivity of shareholder distributions. 
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Table 1 : Variable definitions  
 
Dependent variables 
NetPayout is net payout (dividend + share repurchases - equity issuances) to common 
shareholders for firm i in year t divided by market value of common stock (Compustat 
#25*Compustat #199) at the beginning of year t, where net payout is defined as 
Compustat #127 + Compustat #115 - Compustat #108 - Compustat #19 + Compustat 
#56 - Compustat #56lag1. 
 
Primary independent variable (Variable of interest) 
AT_XXX is asymmetric timeliness of earnings or its accrual or cash flow component, estimated 
using Basu (1997) regression for firm i over a ten-year window from year t-9 to year t.  
XXX is EARN, OCF, ACC, CF or ACCOI.  EARN is earnings before extraordinary 
items (Compustat #123); OCF is operating cash flows (Compustat #308); ACC 
accruals (Compustat #123 - Compustat #308); CF is sum of operating cash flows and 
investing cash flows (Compustat #308 + Compustat #311); and ACCOI is accruals 
(Compustat #123 - Compustat #308 - Compustat #311).  
AT_XXX(R2) is asymmetric timeliness of earnings or its accrual or cash flow component defined as 
R2bad/R2good, where R2bad (R2good) is the r-square from Basu(1997) regression 
(excluding terms containing NEGRET) using negative (positive) return years for firm 
i during a ten-year window from year t-9 to year t.  XXX is EARN, OCF, ACC, CF or 
ACCOI.   
CONSV_skew is the ratio of skewness of earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat #123) to 
skewness of operating cash flows (Compustat #308) for firm i over a ten-year window 
from year t-9 to year t, multiplies by -1. 
CONSV_accrual is the ratio of accumulated nonoperating accruals to accumulated total assets 
(Compustat #6) for firm i over a ten-year window from year t-9 to year t, multiplied 
by -1.  Following Zhang (2008), nonoperating accruals are operating accruals - 
Δaccounts receivable (Compustat #2) - Δinventories (Compustat #3) - Δprepaid 
expenses (Compustat #160) + Δaccounts payable (Compustat #70) + Δtaxes payable 
(Compustat #71), where operating accruals are net income (Compustat #172) + 
depreciation (Compustat #14) - cash flow from operations (Compustat #308).   
 
Other variables 
RET is firms i’s stock returns during year t, defined as the buy-and-hold returns over the 12 
months ending 3 months after the end of year t.  Monthly stock returns are obtained 
from CRSP,  
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NEGRET is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if RET is negative for firm i in year t, 
and zero otherwise,  
LogMVE is the natural log of market value of common equity (Compustat #25*Compustat 
#199) for firm i at the end of year t, 
MB is market to book ratio of equity for firm i at the end of year t (Compustat 
#25*Compustat #199/Compustat #6),  
Leverage is the leverage of firm i at the end of year t, defined as the sum of long-term debt 
(Compustat #9) and short-term debt (Compustat #34) divided by total assets 
(Compustat #6). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
Panel A: Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for our sample over 1997-2005.  Variables are defined in Table 1. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.   * indicates significance at the 5% level.   
 
  Mean Std.Dev Q1 Median Q3 N 
Payout Variables       
NetPayout -0.0169* 0.1181 -0.0096 0 0.0194 35343 
       
AT Variable       
AT_EARN 0.0770* 0.6258 -0.1194 0.0340 0.2313 14142 
AT_ACC 0.0580* 0.8850 -0.1967 0.0141 0.2919 13758 
AT_OCF 0.0144* 0.7008 -0.2141 0.0153 0.2349 13764 
AT_ACCOI 0.0447* 1.4795 -0.3486 0.0296 0.4356 13676 
AT_CF 0.0421* 1.2921 -0.3357 0.0054 0.3608 13682 
AT_EARN(R2) 68.6629* 396.8700 0.2731 1.2784 6.1121 12319 
AT_ACC(R2) 84.6340* 509.8700 0.2630 1.2225 5.7582 12017 
AT_OCF(R2) 70.3628* 421.0700 0.2734 1.2120 5.4641 12021 
AT_ACCOI(R2) 83.5380* 480.8300 0.2883 1.3337 6.2401 11944 
AT_CF(R2) 70.9750* 415.8500 0.2705 1.2874 6.1251 11948 
CONSV_skew -0.1786* 7.7402 -1.3144 -0.3264 0.9581 19151 
CONSV_accrual 0.0208* 0.0360 0.0020 0.0159 0.0337 16917 
       
Other Variables       
RET 0.1879* 0.8272 -0.3096 0.0267 0.4310 35343 
NEGRET 0.4794* 0.4996 0 0 1 35343 
LogMVE 5.4207* 2.2066 3.7668 5.3404 6.9035 35210 
MB 2.8612* 4.2263 1.0740 1.8998 3.4195 35210 
Leverage 0.2216* 0.2128 0.0216 0.1830 0.3502 35210 
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Panel B: Correlations 
This table presents pooled pair-wise Pearson correlations among key variables in our study.  Variables are defined in Table 1. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99%.  Sample period is 1997 to 2005.  * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
  NetPayout AT_EARN AT_ACC AT_OCF AT_EARN(R2) AT_ACC(R2) AT_OCF(R2) CONSV_skew CONSV_accrual RET LogMVE MB Leverage 
NetPayout 1                         
AT_EARN -0.0385* 1            
AT_ACC -0.0267* 0.5474* 1           
AT_OCF -0.0020  0.1350* -0.6942* 1          
AT_EARN(R2) 0.0071 0.0018 -0.0228* 0.0277* 1         
AT_ACC(R2) -0.0021 0.0106 -0.0104 0.0212* 0.0306* 1        
AT_OCF(R2) -0.0048 0.0071 -0.0171* 0.0302* 0.0316* 0.0470* 1       
CONSV_skew 0.0114 -0.0132 -0.0041 0.0013 0.0112 0.0080  -0.0024 1      
CONSV_accrual -0.1402* 0.0310* 0.0353* -0.0233* 0.0116 0.0034 0.0039 0.0139* 1     
RET -0.1291* 0.0134 0.0110  -0.0012 0.0036 -0.0126 -0.0050  0.0065 0.0108 1    
LogMVE 0.1031* -0.0606* -0.0243* -0.0236* 0.0291* 0.0135 0.0494* -0.0063 0.0264* 0.1197* 1   
MB -0.0687* 0.0030  -0.0094 0.0150* -0.0011 0.0172* 0.0311* -0.0062 0.1133* 0.1921* 0.2313* 1  
Leverage 0.0254* 0.0239* 0.0340* -0.0245* 0.0095 -0.0266* -0.0238* 0.0216* 0.0486* -0.0700* 0.0066 -0.1067* 1 
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Table 3:  Asymmetric timeliness of shareholder distributions  
This table presents the results from pooled OLS regressions of shareholder distributions (net payout) on 
stock returns.  Variables are defined in Table 1.  Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
Sample period is 1997 to 2005.  Standard errors are adjusted for within-firm correlations.  Robust t 
statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Independent Variables NetPayout 
NEGRET -0.0012 
  (0.523) 
RET -0.0429 
  (17.786)*** 
NEGRET*RET 0.1119 
  (22.674)*** 
Constant 0.0086 
  (5.320)*** 
Observations 35343 
R-squared 0.040 
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Table 4: The association between asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder 
distributions and asymmetric timeliness of earnings or its components 
 
Panel A: Asymmetric timeliness is defined as α3 on NEGRET*RET in Basu (1997) 
regression. 
 
This table presents the results from pooled OLS regressions of shareholder distributions (net payout) on 
stock returns and asymmetric timeliness of earnings (or accruals and cash flows).  Variables are defined in 
Table 1.  Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  Percentile ranks of asymmetric timeliness 
of earnings, cash flows and accruals are used.  Sample period is 1997 to 2005.  Standard errors are adjusted 
for within-firm correlations.  Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
Independent Variables 
 AT variables included in the regression  
AT_EARN AT_ACC and AT_OCF AT_ACCOI and AT_CF
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NEGRET -0.0029  0.0101  -0.0039  0.0063  -0.0008  0.0098  
 (0.588) (1.205) (0.352) (0.483) (0.056) (0.632) 
RET -0.0249  -0.0135 -0.0124  -0.0023  -0.0059  0.0050  
 (4.429)*** (1.575) (1.369) (0.210) (0.636) (0.468) 
NEGRET*RET 0.0728  0.0740  0.0357  0.0420  0.0416  0.0520  
 (5.150)*** (3.130)*** (1.162) (1.195) (1.194) (1.335) 
AT_EARN -0.0080  -0.0058       
 (1.401) (1.020)       
RET*AT_EARN -0.0065  -0.0086       
 (0.631) (0.823)       
NEGRET*AT_EARN 0.0115  0.0098        
 (1.269) (1.078)       
NEGRET*RET*AT_EARN 0.0321  0.0336        
 (1.261) (1.308)       
AT_ACC    -0.0036 -0.0019 -0.0062 -0.0032 
    (0.481) (0.247) (0.650) (0.325) 
RET*AT_ACC    -0.0166 -0.0193 -0.0227 -0.0255 
    (1.554) (1.771)* (1.971)** (2.157)**
NEGRET*AT_ACC    0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0033 -0.0047 
    (0.022) (0.107) (0.210) (0.301) 
NEGRET*RET*AT_ACC    0.0265 0.0267 0.0012 0.0015 
    (0.792) (0.791) (0.029) (0.037) 
AT_OCF    0.0017 0.0031 0.0038 0.0063 
    (0.232) (0.416) (0.395) (0.643) 
RET*AT_OCF    -0.0166 -0.0162 -0.0258 -0.0259 
    (1.526) (1.464) (2.334)** (2.273)**
 (Continued) 
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Table 4, Panel A: (continued)   
  
NEGRET*AT_OCF    0.0129 0.0122 0.0092 0.0085
    (1.072) (1.001) (0.621) (0.556)
NEGRET*RET*AT_OCF    0.0855 0.0833 0.1037 0.1011
    (2.568)** (2.490)** (2.802)*** (2.655)***
Leverage   -0.0194   -0.0200    -0.0203  
   (1.873)*   (1.916)*  (1.934)* 
RET*Leverage   0.0185   0.0170    0.0157  
   (1.091)   (0.980)  (0.901) 
NEGRET*Leverage   -0.0059   -0.0011  -0.0004 
   (0.406)   (0.073)  (0.029) 
NEGRET*RET*Leverage   -0.0849   -0.0722  -0.0721 
   (2.335)**   (1.958)*  (1.927)* 
MB   0.0002   0.0003  0.0003 
   (0.403)   (0.675)  (0.729) 
RET*MB   -0.0015   -0.0018  -0.0018 
   (3.030)***   (3.391)***  (3.437)***
NEGRET*MB   -0.0011   -0.0010    -0.0011  
   (1.196)   (1.068)  (1.164) 
NEGRET*RET*MB   0.0066   0.0076  0.0075 
   (2.507)**   (2.835)***  (2.725)***
LogMVE   0.0042   0.0036  0.0035 
   (6.143)***   (5.278)***  (5.084)***
RET*LogMVE   -0.0012   -0.0007  -0.0007 
   (1.009)   (0.544)  (0.566) 
NEGRET*LogMVE   -0.0011   -0.0009  -0.0009 
   (1.076)   (0.807)  (0.854) 
NEGRET*RET*LogMVE   -0.0019   -0.0037  -0.0045 
   (0.663)   (1.251)  (1.470) 
Constant 0.0215  -0.0028  0.0197  -0.0020  0.0206  -0.0020  
 (6.794)*** (0.500) (2.844)*** (0.243) (2.231)** (0.193) 
Observations 14142 14097 13758 13713 13676 13631 
R-squared 0.034 0.044 0.036 0.046 0.037 0.047 
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Panel B: Asymmetric timeliness is defined as R2bad/R2good, where R2bad (R2good) is the 
R2 of Basu (1997) regression (excluding terms containing NEGRET) estimated using 
negative (positive) return years.  
 
This table presents the results from pooled OLS regressions of shareholder distributions (net payout) on 
stock returns and asymmetric timeliness of earnings (or accruals and cash flows).  Variables are defined in 
Table 1.  Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  Percentile ranks of asymmetric timeliness 
of earnings, cash flows and accruals are used.  Sample period is 1997 to 2005.  Standard errors are adjusted 
for within-firm correlations.  Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
Independent Variables 
 AT variables included in the regression  
AT_EARN(R2) 
AT_ACC(R2) and 
AT_OCF(R2) 
AT_ACCOI(R2) 
 and AT_CF(R2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NEGRET 0.0028 0.0136 0.0022 0.0127 0.0004 0.0110 
 (0.526) (1.587) (0.364) (1.451) (0.064) (1.221) 
RET -0.0206 -0.0113 -0.0235 -0.0138 -0.0244 -0.0136 
 (3.862)*** (1.305) (3.540)*** (1.546) (3.689)*** (1.405) 
NEGRET*RET 0.0740 0.0811 0.0860 0.0933 0.0806 0.0874 
 (5.392)*** (3.501)*** (5.849)*** (3.967)*** (5.292)*** (3.577)***
AT_EARN(R2) 0.0206 0.0190        
 (3.364)*** (3.095)***       
RET*AT_EARN(R2) -0.0175 -0.0183       
 (1.625) (1.685)*       
NEGRET*AT_EARN(R2) 0.0041 0.0039       
 (0.473) (0.448)       
NEGRET*RET*AT_EARN(R2) 0.0354 0.0418       
 (1.479) (1.716)*       
AT_ACC(R2)    0.0007 0.0002 0.0027 0.0022 
    (0.099) (0.024) (0.323) (0.260) 
RET*AT_ACC(R2)    0.0035 0.0030  0.0176 0.0174 
    (0.274) (0.239) (1.153) (1.140) 
NEGRET*AT_ACC(R2)    0.0011 0.0014 0.0081 0.0070 
    (0.116) (0.151) (0.719) (0.627) 
NEGRET*RET*AT_ACC(R2)    -0.0286 -0.0183 -0.0287 -0.0254 
    (1.108) (0.724) (0.976) (0.865) 
AT_OCF(R2)    0.0120  0.0099 0.0158 0.0147 
    (1.695)* (1.409) (2.041)** (1.922)* 
RET*AT_OCF(R2)    -0.0122 -0.0104 -0.0227 -0.0236 
    (0.998) (0.848) (1.726)* (1.789)* 
 (Continued) 
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Table 4, Panel B: (continued)   
 
NEGRET*AT_OCF(R2)    0.0045 0.0042 0.0027 0.0030  
    (0.468) (0.433) (0.246) (0.284) 
NEGRET*RET*AT_OCF(R2)    0.0366 0.0300  0.0471 0.0524 
    (1.451) (1.165) (1.553) (1.717)* 
Leverage   -0.0239   -0.0239  -0.0237 
   (2.065)**   (2.028)**  (2.006)** 
RET*Leverage   0.0224   0.0186  0.0194 
   (1.226)   (1.003)  (1.024) 
NEGRET*Leverage   -0.0002   -0.0004  0.0005 
   (0.016)   (0.025)  (0.031) 
NEGRET*RET*Leverage   -0.0969   -0.0916  -0.0925 
   (2.707)***   (2.513)**  (2.508)** 
MB   -0.0001   0.0000   0.0000  
   (0.183)   (0.032)  (0.012) 
RET*MB   -0.0016   -0.0018  -0.0018 
   (3.100)***   (3.274)***  (3.281)***
NEGRET*MB   -0.0004   -0.0005  -0.0002 
   (0.396)   (0.452)  (0.197) 
NEGRET*RET*MB   0.0085   0.0091  0.0099 
   (2.967)***   (3.123)***  (3.334)***
LogMVE   0.0038   0.0036  0.0035 
   (5.016)***   (4.620)***  (4.494)***
RET*LogMVE   -0.0010    -0.0010   -0.0010  
   (0.756)   (0.685)  (0.736) 
NEGRET*LogMVE   -0.0015   -0.0014  -0.0015 
   (1.275)   (1.170)  (1.250) 
NEGRET*RET*LogMVE   -0.0035   -0.0037  -0.0043 
   (1.081)   (1.124)  (1.268) 
Constant 0.0056 -0.0122 0.0099 -0.0067 0.0065 -0.0100  
 (1.501) (2.030)** (2.219)** (1.085) (1.526) (1.622) 
Observations 12319 12277 12017 11975 11944 11902 
R-squared 0.037 0.046 0.035 0.045 0.038 0.047 
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Panel C: Asymmetric timeliness is defined as relative skewness of earnings 
(CONSV_skew) or accumulated nonoperating accruals (CONSV_accrual). 
This table presents the results from pooled OLS regressions of shareholder distributions (net payout) on 
stock returns and asymmetric timeliness of earnings (or accruals and cash flows).  Variables are defined in 
Table 1.  Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  Percentile ranks of conservatism measures 
are used.  Sample period is 1997 to 2005.  Standard errors are adjusted for within-firm correlations.  Robust 
t statistics are reported in parentheses.   ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.   
 
 AT variables included in the regression 
 CONSV_skew CONSV_accrual 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NEGRET 0.0022 0.0115 0.0021 0.0049 
 (0.510) (1.469) (0.484) (0.684) 
RET -0.0326 -0.0245 -0.0268 -0.0249 
 (6.174)*** (3.088)*** (5.100)*** (3.124)*** 
NEGRET*RET 0.1058 0.1083 0.0960  0.0974 
 (9.139)*** (5.215)*** (7.938)*** (4.963)*** 
CONSV_skew -0.0009 0.0017   
 (0.175) (0.326)   
RET* CONSV_skew 0.0097  0.0076    
 (0.985) (0.777)   
NEGRET* CONSV_skew 0.0046 0.0037   
 (0.610) (0.494)   
NEGRET*RET* CONSV_skew -0.0115 -0.0023   
 (0.576) (0.116)   
CONSV_accrual   -0.0337 -0.0361 
   (5.790)*** (6.170)*** 
RET* CONSV_accrual   -0.0032 -0.0031 
   (0.331) (0.313) 
NEGRET* CONSV_accrual   0.0013 0.0017 
   (0.169) (0.205) 
NEGRET*RET* CONSV_accrual   -0.0086 -0.0136 
   (0.401) (0.634) 
Leverage  -0.0189  -0.0197 
  (2.126)**  (2.050)** 
RET*Leverage  0.0146  0.0172 
  (1.079)  (1.135) 
NEGRET*Leverage  -0.0006  0.0073 
  (0.046)  (0.545) 
NEGRET*RET*Leverage  -0.0798  -0.0525 
  (2.615)***  (1.616) 
 (Continued) 
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Table 4, Panel C: (continued)   
 
MB  0.0006  0.0006 
  (1.732)*  (1.593) 
RET*MB  -0.0018  -0.0015 
  (4.141)***  (3.174)*** 
NEGRET*MB  -0.0008  -0.0001 
  (0.968)  (0.081) 
NEGRET*RET*MB  0.0112  0.0106 
  (4.084)***  (3.815)*** 
LogMVE  0.0037  0.0037 
  (5.696)***  (5.362)*** 
RET*LogMVE  -0.0001  0.0006 
  (0.046)  (0.411) 
NEGRET*LogMVE  -0.0007  -0.0003 
  (0.732)  (0.329) 
NEGRET*RET*LogMVE  -0.0055  -0.0050 
  (1.745)*  (1.559) 
Constant 0.0155 -0.0083 0.0329 0.0117 
 (5.397)*** (1.592) (10.541)*** (2.236)** 
Observations 19151 19093 16917 16869 
R-squared 0.037 0.048 0.046 0.058 
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Panel D: Asymmetric timeliness is defined as α3 on NEGRET*RET in Basu (1997) 
regression estimated over 15 years 
 
This table presents the results from pooled OLS regressions of shareholder distributions (net payout) on 
stock returns and asymmetric timeliness of earnings (or accruals and cash flows).  Variables are defined in 
Table 1.  Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  Asymmetric timeliness is defined as α3 on 
NEGRET*RET in Basu (1997) regression estimated for each firm over 15 years (year t-14 to year t).  
Percentile ranks of asymmetric timeliness of earnings, cash flows and accruals are used.  Sample period is 
2002 to 2005.  Standard errors are adjusted for within-firm correlations.  Robust t statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
Independent Variables 
 AT variables included in the regression  
AT_EARN AT_ACC and AT_OCF AT_ACCOI and AT_CF
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NEGRET -0.0015 -0.0111 -0.0212 -0.0257 0.0249 0.0174 
 (0.144) (0.638) (1.065) (1.103) (0.886) (0.608) 
RET -0.0353 -0.0404 -0.0286 -0.0310 -0.0056 -0.0061 
 (2.613)*** (1.868)* (1.154) (1.193) (0.247) (0.279) 
NEGRET*RET 0.1005 0.0895 -0.0506 -0.0488 0.0816 0.0814 
 (2.467)** (1.461) (0.685) (0.589) (1.060) (1.116) 
AT_EARN -0.015 -0.0121       
 (1.381) (1.130)       
RET*AT_EARN -0.0042 -0.0057       
 (0.180) (0.250)       
NEGRET*AT_EARN -0.0055 -0.0068       
 (0.273) (0.343)       
NEGRET*RET*AT_EARN 0.0115 0.0133       
 (0.157) (0.187)       
AT_ACC    -0.0089 -0.0043 -0.0262 -0.019 
    (0.570) (0.270) (1.396) (1.001) 
RET*AT_ACC    -0.0257 -0.0303 -0.0327 -0.0385 
    (1.066) (1.228) (1.272) (1.513) 
NEGRET*AT_ACC    -0.0033 -0.0087 -0.0521 -0.0585 
    (0.146) (0.381) (1.678)* (1.872)* 
NEGRET*RET*AT_ACC    0.1351 0.1340 -0.0618 -0.0713 
    (1.624) (1.614) (0.716) (0.840) 
AT_OCF    -0.0172 -0.0140 -0.0220 -0.0147 
    (1.006) (0.810) (1.207) (0.798) 
RET*AT_OCF    0.0120 0.0113 -0.0331 -0.0378 
    (0.403) (0.371) (1.231) (1.390) 
 (Continued) 
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Table 4, Panel D: (continued)    
 
NEGRET*AT_OCF    0.0367 0.0298 -0.0118 -0.0167
    (1.639) (1.312) (0.398) (0.556)
NEGRET*RET*AT_OCF    0.1624 0.1422 0.0931 0.0788
    (1.952)* (1.677)* (1.113) (0.944)
Leverage   -0.0249   -0.0254  -0.0252 
   (1.183)   (1.168)   (1.159) 
RET*Leverage   0.0258   0.0267  0.0234 
   (0.745)   (0.742)  (0.674) 
NEGRET*Leverage   -0.0186   -0.0079  -0.0085 
   (0.601)   (0.259)  (0.271) 
NEGRET*RET*Leverage   -0.1599   -0.1260  -0.1210 
   (1.921)*   (1.596)  (1.497) 
MB   0.0012   0.0012  0.0014 
   (1.840)*   (1.751)*  (1.972)** 
RET*MB   -0.0023   -0.0025  -0.0027 
   (1.846)*   (1.955)*  (2.165)** 
NEGRET*MB   0.0000    0.0003  0.0005 
   (0.013)   (0.157)  (0.261) 
NEGRET*RET*MB   0.0159   0.0162  0.0189 
   (2.319)**   (2.319)**  (2.704)***
LogMVE   0.0027   0.0028  0.0025 
   (2.205)**   (2.183)**  (1.921)* 
RET*LogMVE   0.0020   0.0019  0.0022 
   (0.733)   (0.685)  (0.793) 
NEGRET*LogMVE   0.0026   0.0022  0.0025 
   (1.251)   (1.024)  (1.131) 
NEGRET*RET*LogMVE   -0.0011   -0.0029  -0.0033 
   (0.224)   (0.621)  (0.665) 
Constant 0.0304 0.0100  0.0353 0.0124 0.0473 0.0225 
 (5.138)*** (0.977) (2.298)** (0.716) (2.677)*** (1.138) 
Observations 4364 4347 4197 4182 4175 4160 
R-squared 0.050 0.064 0.051 0.065 0.053 0.067 
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Table 5: The association between asymmetric sensitivity of shareholder 
distributions and asymmetric timeliness of earnings components for subsamples 
with pronounced shareholder-debtholder conflicts 
 
This table presents the results from pooled OLS regressions of shareholder distributions (net payout) on 
stock returns and asymmetric timeliness of earnings (or accruals and cash flows) for three subsamples with 
pronounced shareholder-debtholder conflicts.  Variables are defined in Table 1.  Continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99%.  Asymmetric timeliness is defined as α3 on NEGRET*RET in Basu (1997) 
regression estimated for each firm over 10 years (year t-9 to year t).  Percentile ranks of asymmetric 
timeliness of cash flows and accruals are used.  Sample period is 1997 to 2005.  Standard errors are 
adjusted for within-firm correlations.  Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
 
 Subsample used in the estimation  
High leverage 
Debt rating below 
investment grade 
High standard deviation 
of ROA (STDROA) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NEGRET 0.0127 0.0204 -0.0297 -0.0006 -0.0182 0.0082 
 (0.873) (1.016) (1.053) (0.013) (0.953) (0.333) 
RET 0.0089 0.0347 -0.0129 -0.0217 -0.0174 -0.0018 
 (0.717) (1.842)* (0.832) (0.670) (1.329) (0.098) 
NEGRET*RET 0.0178 -0.013 0.023 0.0614 0.0237 0.0337 
 (0.506) (0.277) (0.309) (0.501) (0.509) (0.596) 
AT_ACC -0.0028 -0.0014 -0.0719 -0.0705 -0.0022 0.0010 
 (0.272) (0.139) (3.405)*** (3.346)*** (0.165) (0.069) 
RET*AT_ACC -0.0321 -0.0317 0.0216 0.0187 -0.0212 -0.0242 
 (2.086)** (2.100)** (1.072) (0.980) (1.329) (1.463) 
NEGRET*AT_ACC -0.0159 -0.0174 0.0331 0.0409 -0.0106 -0.0137 
 (0.955) (1.054) (0.960) (1.153) (0.475) (0.614) 
NEGRET*RET*AT_ACC 0.0201 0.0147 -0.0372 -0.0122 -0.0078 -0.007 
 (0.528) (0.388) (0.476) (0.149) (0.154) (0.137) 
AT_OCF 0.0072 0.0090  -0.0458 -0.0473 -0.0073 -0.0057 
 (0.750) (0.922) (2.548)** (2.519)** (0.483) (0.368) 
RET*AT_OCF -0.0304 -0.0309 -0.0074 -0.0061 0.0011 0.0009 
 (2.092)** (2.141)** (0.457) (0.351) (0.059) (0.048) 
NEGRET*AT_OCF -0.0054 -0.0058 0.0308 0.0334 0.0537 0.0528 
 (0.339) (0.366) (1.083) (1.147) (2.365)** (2.312)**
NEGRET*RET*AT_OCF 0.0924 0.0942 0.0039 0.0044 0.1056 0.1069 
 (2.213)** (2.278)** (0.048) (0.053) (2.064)** (2.063)**
Leverage   -0.0071   -0.0179   -0.045 
   (0.405)   (0.685)   (1.810)* 
RET*Leverage   -0.0437   0.0186   0.0238 
   (1.706)*   (0.641)   (0.762) 
 (Continued) 
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Table 5: (continued)    
   
NEGRET*Leverage   -0.0117   -0.0384   0.0095 
   (0.407)   (0.889)   (0.290) 
NEGRET*RET*Leverage   0.0262   -0.0912   -0.0847 
   (0.393)   (0.964)   (1.369) 
MB   0.0006   0.0000    -0.0007 
   (1.493)   (0.020)   (0.993) 
RET*MB   -0.0008   -0.0003   -0.0005 
   (1.375)   (0.350)   (0.638) 
NEGRET*MB   0.0002   -0.0039   -0.0002 
   (0.237)   (1.158)   (0.157) 
NEGRET*RET*MB   0.0050    -0.0049   0.0017 
   (1.473)   (0.433)   (0.522) 
LogMVE   0.0040    -0.0016   0.0061 
   (4.131)***   (0.608)   (3.661)***
RET*LogMVE   -0.0008   0.0005   -0.0028 
   (0.363)   (0.140)   (1.108) 
NEGRET*LogMVE   -0.0004   -0.0019   -0.0048 
   (0.272)   (0.357)   (1.944)* 
NEGRET*RET*LogMVE   -0.0013   -0.0003   -0.0017 
   (0.322)   (0.027)   (0.318) 
Constant 0.0144 -0.0137 0.0494 0.0666 -0.0020 -0.0281 
 (1.598) (1.119) (2.976)*** (2.182)** (0.171) (1.795)* 
       
Observations 7346 7345 1581 1581 4785 4761 
R-squared 0.024 0.039 0.018 0.023 0.028 0.035 
   
  
 
